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Abstract
Smart metering allows electricity utilities to provide consumers with better information on their energy
usage and to apply time of use tariffs. These measures have been shown to reduce electricity consumption and
induce time-shifting of demand. Less is known about how they affect residential energy efficiency investment
behaviour. Using data from a randomised-controlled trial on a sample of over 2500 Irish consumers we show
that exposure to time of use pricing and better information over a 12 month period can have the unintended
effect of reducing investment in energy efficiency measures within the home.
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1 Introduction
Reducing energy consumption and increasing the adoption of energy saving measures and energy efficient appli-
ances are seen as crucial elements in reducing energy demand. The EU Energy Efficiency Directive, EU (2012),
aims to try and ”remove barriers and overcome market failures that impede efficiency in the supply and use
of energy”. However users seems reluctant to engage fully with this process. This reluctance to adopt energy
efficient appliances that offer them seemingly positive NPV is known as the ”Energy Paradox” and has been
widely studied1. Early work by Hausman (1979) indicates that consumers apply a 20 percent discount rate in the
trade off between operating cost and initial purchase price when buying home air conditioning systems. Dubin
and McFadden (1984) find similar discount rates are applied in space and water heating investments. Others
would disagree about the magnitude of this; many authors, including Metcalf and Hassett (1999) and Allcott
and Greenstone (2012) have raised the point that realised returns are generally less than engineering estimates
would indicate2. Some would argue that the difference between this implicit discount rate and the interest rate
offered by other investments could be seen as a market failure, Ruderman et al. (1987), while others argue that
due to uncertainty over future energy prices and the irreversible nature of the investment, high discount rates
might be appropriate and this would not constitute a market failure, Jaffe and Stavins (1994).
Jaffe and Stavins (1994) cite three potential sources of information market failure. 1) If improved information
is a public good, the market might tend to provide less than the socially optimum level. 2) If information is
conveyed by the adopter, and the adopter is not compensated by the market for the positive externality they
create by adopting, this constitutes a market failure. 3) If whoever possesses the information doesn’t benefit from
the cost savings, i.e. if they are not the bill payer. They have no financial incentive to act on the information.
Insofar as this is an information problem, it may be possible to remedy by educating consumers. Allcott
and Mullainathan (2010), cite the growing evidence of the effectiveness of behavioural interventions, rather than
price-based approaches in changing consumer choices. Other work by Allcott and Greenstone (2012) argues that
while lack of information may be a problem for some consumers, in order to account for consumer heterogeneity,
it is crucial to design targeted policies. This point is also made by Golove and Eto (1996). Otherwise providing
information may have some unintended consequences.
Recently in the UK, DEFRA commissioned a report called ”Exploring Catalyst Behaviours”, Brook-Lyndhurst
(2011). The aim of this report was to review the literature on pro-environmental behaviour, to determine if
policies aimed at encouraging certain types of pro-environmental behaviour ”spill-over” into other domains3.
This stream of research is informed by the environmental psychology literature and a number of studies have
examined this. The idea that people strive to be consistent in their beliefs, attitudes and behaviours comes from
a range of social-psychological theories rooted in Festinger (1962)’s theory of cognitive dissonance.
It is also possible that these spill-overs might be negative. For instance if individuals felt that they had
already made a sacrifice, and have an ”alibi”, this might reduce their motivation to change their behaviour in
other domains. Alternatively if faced with a number of options, individuals will take the one that is of least cost
to them.
Thogersen and Olander (2003) conduct a three wave survey on a panel of Danish consumers. Questions were
asked about their behaviours related to recycling, buying organic food, using sustainable transport and domestic
energy conservation. The authors find some positive spill-over effects, but the magnitude is small. They also
find evidence of some negative ones. They find that spill-over is higher amongst individuals who place a strong
1See Blumstein et al. (1980), Golove and Eto (1996) and Allcott and Greenstone (2012) for a review
2Primarily due to lab-based estimates of appliance performance not bearing out in reality. Also consumer heterogeneity and the
typically slow diffusion rates of technically superior products must be considered.
3i.e. If one is encouraged to recycle, does this make them more likely to reduce electricity consumption?
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value on environment-friendly behaviour.
Other work by Thogersen (2004) argues that if behaviours share the same motivational roots, we should
expect them to be correlated. In a study on 309 consumers in a Danish shopping mall, the author find that
correlations between various environmentally responsible behaviours do exist, but are small in magnitude. The
issue of negative correlations is also raised. The results suggest that when people act inconsistently, it is because
they dont find the contradictory behaviour to be morally important.
Whitmarsh and O’Neill (2010) investigate the existence of spill-over effects amongst UK consumers. They
find environmental self-identity to be a strong predictor of environmentally friendly behaviour in a number of
spheres; waste reduction, regular water and domestic energy conservation. They also conclude that spill-overs
do exist but the underlying identity of consumers is more important and it is difficult to disentangle the two.
Many countries are implementing smart-metering programmes in order to provide consumers with better
information in the hope that this will encourage a reduction in consumption, or a move of consumption from
periods when increasing generation is expensive to periods when generating electricity is cheaper. A number
of studies examine the effect of providing In-Home Displays (IHD) to consumers in order to encourage reduced
consumption. Faruqui et al. (2010) provide a useful summary. Their review of a number of North American
studies indicates that IHDs can induce consumers to reduce consumption by 7% on average4. Directly relevant
to this research, the Commission for Energy Regulation (CER) in Ireland conducted a smart metering trial and
found that customers reduced average overall usage by 2.5% and peak usage by 8%, CER (2011)5.
Reduced consumption could be considered a short-term effect. Less is known about whether feedback can
induce long-term behavioural change, by changing investment behaviour. This raises an interesting question: if
consumers are motivated to reduce consumption, through an time of use pricing combined with more information
in their bills or an in-home display, does this also encourage them to make capital investments in energy efficiency?
We exploit access to a unique dataset6 in order to investigate this question. Our contribution is in showing
that increased information can actually reduce investment, for a set of consumers who also reduced consumption
of electricity. As far as we are aware, this has not been empirically demonstrated before. More generally we
demonstrate how interventions to change certain behaviours in one domain can have unintended consequences
in others. This is something that must be considered by policy makers when designing market interventions.
2 Data and Methods
2.1 Data
We use data from the CER Smart Metering Customer Behavioural Trial. This is a nationally representative
sample of over 5,000 households in the Republic of Ireland, containing high frequency energy consumption data
along with socioeconomic information on the participants. It took place over eighteen months; the benchmark
period was from 1st July to 31st December 2009, and the test period was from 1st January to 31st December
2010 The survey was conducted on Electric Ireland customers who at that time represented 100 percent of Irish
residential electricity demand. It was designed to quantify the effect better information and time of use pricing
could have on overall electricity usage and on peak demand, not to examine investment behaviour. However we
can exploit before and after survey questions related to a range of energy efficiency measures adopted within
the home. Households self-selected into the trial and were randomly assigned to a control group or various
4Reduction was as high as 18% in some cases
5This was through the use of IHDs, other information stimuli and time of use tariffs
6CER Electricity Smart Metering Customer Behavioural Trial data.
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treatment groups in order to estimate the effect of different stimuli on residential electricity demand. For further
information on this study, please see CER (2011), Di Cosmo et al. (2014) and Carroll et al. (2013).
We start with N = 3488 households. We merge the pre-trial and post trial surveys and drop households who
received a financial reward for achieving a reduction target. We also drop households who were on a ”weekend”
tariff as they did not receive a feedback stimulus. This leaves us with a sample of N = 2456 observations. This is
divided into control and treatment groups as per table 2. Households received the following information stimuli
and time of use tariffs:
1. Treatment 1: Bi-monthly electricity usage statement
2. Treatment 2: Monthly electricity usage statement
3. Treatment 3: Electronic in-house display and bi-monthly electricity usage statement7
Table 1: Time-of-Use Tariffs (/kWh) excluding VAT
Night Day Peak
Tariff A 12 14 20
Tariff B 11 13.5 26
Tariff C 10 13 32
Tariff D 9 12.5 38
Table 2: Treatment Matrix
Control Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Total
Control 693 0 0 0 693
Tariff A 0 199 219 208 626
Tariff B 0 82 89 67 238
Tariff C 0 226 220 205 651
Tariff D 0 81 89 78 248
Total 693 588 617 558 2,456
2.2 Methods
After the trial was conducted participants were asked whether they had adopted a range of energy efficiency
measures over the previous 12 months. Details are below in table 3.
7This provides real-time consumption, cost and tariff information
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Table 3: In-trial adoption of energy efficient measures
Energy saving measures installed Number Percent
Added double glazing to some or all of your windows 199 8%
Installed attic or wall insulation 676 28%
Replaced appliances with A rated ones 396 16%
Fitted a new lagging jacket on your hot water tank 326 13%
Fitted other energy saving devices 206 8%
Added solar panels 35 1%
Added draught-proofing to your doors or windows 241 10%
Replaced a central heating boiler with a more efficient one 164 7%
Added thermostatic controls to radiators 181 7%
None of these 1170 48%
Total 2,456 1
We are interested in the effect improved information had on in-trial adoption. The hypothesis we want to
test is:
 H0: The treatment had no effect on capital investment in energy saving measures
vs
 HA: The treatment had an effect on capital investment in energy saving measures
This is tested in a number of different ways. A simple t-test to check for equality of the mean number of
in-trial adoptions was employed first. The hypothesis tested was H0 : µc = µt vs HA : µc 6= µt. Where µc is the
mean of the control group and µt is the mean of each of the different treatment groups.
Following this, a binary adopter variable was created (1 if they adopted any of the above measures, 0
otherwise). Using this as the dependent variable, a logit model was estimated to examine if treatment altered
the probability of being an adopter. Formally, the hypothesis tested was H0: β1 = 0 vs HA: β1 6= 0, where
Pr(Y = 1|x) = p(x) and log p(x)1−p(x) = β0 + β1Dii.
Finally, a count variable was created to measures the number of adoptions each household made. This was
used to examine if treatment changed the expected number of energy saving features adopted. As the data is
over-dispersed, a Negative Binomial model was employed here rather than a Poisson model. The hypothesis
tested was H0: β1 = 0 vs HA: β1 6= 0, where E[yi|xi, i] = exp(β0 + β1Di + i). Di represents the different
treatment groups in both of the above models. Further information on the dependent variables (yi) used can be
found in tables 11 and 12 in Annex B.
2.3 Randomisation
Of primary concern is the accuracy of the pre-trial randomisation. If systematic differences exist between
control and treatment groups, this could lead to post trial outcomes that would not be due to the treatment.
Of particular interest is the pre-trial stock of energy efficiency measures installed by households. From table 4
below we can see that this is very evenly distributed amongst control and treatment groups.
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Table 4: Pre-trial adoption of energy efficient measures and electricity usage
Energy Efficiency Measure Control Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Total
Proportion of energy saving lightbulbs (scale: 1-5)
mean 2.86 2.85 2.90 2.83 2.86
sd 1.41 1.40 1.40 1.44 1.41
Proportion of double-glazed windows (scale: 1-5)
mean 4.53 4.55 4.49 4.59 4.54
sd 1.18 1.14 1.24 1.12 1.17
Hot-water tank has a lagging jacket? (1 = yes, 0 = no)
mean 0.83 0.82 0.85 0.84 0.84
sd 0.38 0.38 0.36 0.36 0.37
Attic insulation within the last 5 years? (1 = yes, 0 = no)
mean 0.36 0.34 0.35 0.32 0.35
sd 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.48
Attic insulation over 5 years ago? (1 = yes, 0 = no)
mean 0.54 0.56 0.55 0.57 0.55
sd 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
External wall insulation (1 = yes, 0 = no)
mean 0.56 0.56 0.58 0.58 0.57
sd 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.50
Pre-trial electricity usage (kWh)
mean 2048 2097 2091 2074 2077
sd 1019 993 1024 1006 1011
Tables 8, 9 and 10 in Annex A demonstrate how there are no systematic differences between control and
treatment groups across a whole range of measures that include; socioeconomic factors, house variables, stock
of household appliances and heating type. Di Cosmo et al. (2014) also found no individual or household char-
acteristics to be a significant predictor of being in the control group. Another concern is that some element of
the survey design influenced one group more than another. We have contacted the company that designed the
experiment and have been assured that neither group received instructions as to energy efficient upgrades.
3 Results
This section presents the results of the tests for equality of means, a logit model examining if treatment altered
the probability of adopting any measure, and a negative binomial model testing if treatment influenced the
number energy saving measures installed in the home.
3.1 Equality of means
Examining the in-trial adoptions for control and treatment groups, it is immediately obvious from table 5 that
the control group, on average, made more capital investments than any of the treatment groups in energy
efficiency measures during the trial period.
Table 5: Summary statistics for in-trial adoption by group
Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Control 693 1.128 0.052 1.373 [1.026 - 1.231]
Treatment 1 588 0.963 0.053 1.284 [0.859 - 1.067]
Treatment 2 617 0.896 0.048 1.196 [0.802 - 0.991]
Treatment 3 558 0.937 0.055 1.291 [0.830 - 1.045]
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Further analysis on the difference between control and treatment group means, reported in table 6, allows
us to reject the null hypothesis, that there is no difference between the mean of the control group and the mean
of any treatment group8. Furthermore, we can conclude that the mean of the control group is greater than the
mean of any treatment group9. Welch’s t-test is used to allow for samples with unequal variance.
Table 6: Difference in mean in-trial adoption between control and treatment groups
Diff Mean Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] HA : diff 6= 0 HA : diff > 0
Control-Treatment1 0.166 0.074 [0.020 - 0.312] 0.026 0.013
Control-Treatment2 0.232 0.071 [0.093 - 0.371] 0.001 0.001
Control-Treatment3 0.191 0.076 [0.043 - 0.339] 0.012 0.006
3.2 Probability of adopting any energy saving measure
The results from the binary regression model further confirm the result that treatment had a negative effect
on adoption. We report odds rations (OR). As can be seen from table 7 below, the treatment groups are less
likely to adopt than the control group. Interpreting the odds ratios, we can conclude that the treatment group
were 23%-28% less likely to adopt any energy saving measure over the 12 month trial period. Decomposing
the dependent variable, we find the result is driven by the adoption of lagging jackets, attic insulation and
double-glazing. No other variables are statistically significant.
3.3 Number of energy saving measures adopted
Treatment not only reduced the likelihood of adoption, but also reduced the number of energy saving investments
that households made. The results of the negative binomial regression are also reported in table 7. Reporting
the incident rate ratios (IRRs) it is found that being in the treatment group reduced the expected number of
energy saving features adopted by 15%-21%.
8We reject H0 at a 1% level of significance for treatment 2, and at a 5% level for treatments 1 and 3
9We reject H0 at a 1% level of significance for treatments 2 and 3, and at a 5% level for treatment 1
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Table 7: Regression results
(1) (2)
Logit (OR) Negative Binomial (IRR)
Treatment 1 0.77** 0.85**
(0.09) (0.06)
Treatment 2 0.71*** 0.79***
(0.08) (0.06)
Treatment 3 0.72*** 0.83**
(0.08) (0.06)
Constant 1.37*** 1.13**
(0.11) (0.05)
lnalpha -0.34***
(0.08)
Observations 2,456 2,456
ll -1693 -3368
dfm 3 3
chi2 12.42 11.92
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1
For robustness we also ran both of the above models including a range of household level control variables
that may influence adoption. We do not report these results in the text as they do not significantly alter the
magnitude or significance of our findings. We are happy to share these results with any interested reader. We
tested for equality of coefficients in both of the above models and the treatment groups are not statistically
different from each other.
4 Conclusion
We find that being supplied with better electricity usage information and time of use tariffs led to lower in-
vestment in energy efficiency measures. To our knowledge, this result has not been empirically demonstrated
previously. It must be stressed that due to the short time-scale of this study, it was only possible to monitor
behaviour over a 12 month period. Another interesting element to note is that while this was an electricity
smart-metering trial, most of the capital investments related to heating, not electricity10.
This raises an interesting question: Why were the treatment groups induced to reduce their investment be-
haviour? We are unable to answer this, given our data but a number of theories might explain this behaviour.
One is that the prevailing wisdom amongst consumers is that one should invest in order to increase energy
efficiency. However, once feedback quantifies the reduction in consumption that can be achieved through adap-
tation, this induces them to reduce their investment. Related to this is the idea of negative spill-overs. Perhaps
reducing consumption gave people an alibi, they felt less inclined to invest as they had already made a sacrifice.
10Only 1 % of the sample have electric heating. See table 10 in Annex A
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Reducing consumption is a lesser cost alternative to investing in energy efficiency measures. Further research
could shed some light on this question. (question on influence of trial)
A concern is that there is some systematic difference between the control and treatment groups, due to
the randomisation not having been conducted correctly. As outlined in section ??, Annex A and as shown
in Di Cosmo et al. (2014), we are confident that this is not the case. Alternatively, perhaps some aspect of
the experimental design or survey questions influenced the behaviour of either control or treatment group with
regard to investment in energy efficiency.
In terms of the policy relevance of this research, this result demonstrates the crucial need to design targeted
policies when aiming to remove the market barriers to energy efficiency, as argued by Allcott and Greenstone
(2012), amongst others. It also highlights the benefit of monitoring various other behaviours, beyond the specific
target of the trial. Given the widespread implementation of smart-metering trials, we feel this opens a avenue
for others to empirically test whether our results are reproduced in other countries and across different domains.
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5 Annexes
5.1 Annex A
Table 8: Pre-trial distribution of socioeconomic characteristics
Variable control treatment 1 treatment 2 treatment 3 total
Gender
male 52% 47% 52% 51% 51%
female 48% 53% 48% 49% 49%
age
18− 25 0% 1% 0% 1% 0%
26− 35 8% 10% 7% 9% 9%
36− 45 18% 20% 20% 20% 19%
46− 55 24% 24% 25% 24% 24%
56− 65 21% 22% 24% 23% 22%
65+ 28% 23% 22% 22% 24%
refused 1% 1% 1% 0% 1%
Employment Status
employee 43% 49% 47% 47% 46%
self-employed (no employees) 4% 5% 5% 8% 5%
self-employed (with employees) 6% 7% 8% 5% 6%
unemployed (seeking work) 4% 3% 5% 4% 4%
unemployed (not seeking work) 3% 4% 4% 3% 4%
retired 38% 31% 30% 32% 33%
carer 2% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Social Class
AB 12% 14% 16% 17% 15%
C1 25% 29% 27% 28% 27%
C2 18% 16% 15% 17% 16%
DE 42% 38% 38% 35% 39%
F 3% 2% 3% 2% 2%
refused 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Education
no formal education 1% 1% 2% 1% 1%
primary 15% 10% 11% 11% 11%
secondary to junior cert 15% 19% 17% 16% 17%
secondary to leaving cert 30% 29% 28% 28% 29%
third level 34% 37% 37% 39% 36%
refused 5% 6% 5% 6% 5%
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Table 10: Pre-trial distribution of appliance stock and heating type
Variable Control Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3
Appliance
washing machine 28% 24% 25% 23%
tumble drier 29% 23% 26% 22%
dishwasher 28% 24% 26% 22%
electric shower instant 28% 24% 26% 23%
electric shower pumped 27% 25% 25% 22%
electric cooker 29% 25% 24% 22%
stand alone freezer 27% 25% 25% 23%
water pump 28% 21% 28% 24%
immersion 28% 24% 25% 23%
solar panels to heat water 17% 26% 35% 22%
Heating Type
electric 118% 89% 109% 80%
electric (plug-in) 213% 42% 119% 0%
gas 91% 103% 108% 99%
oil 97% 101% 100% 103%
solid fuel 113% 93% 91% 100%
renewable 63% 147% 117% 78%
other 89% 183% 75% 55%
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Table 9: Pre-trial distribution of house characteristics
Variable Control Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Total
House type
apartment 2% 1% 1% 2% 2%
semi-detached house 30% 33% 29% 29% 30%
detached house 27% 26% 29% 27% 27%
terraced house 14% 15% 14% 14% 14%
bungalow 27% 24% 27% 27% 26%
refused 0% 1% 0% 0% 0%
Tenure type
rent from a private landlord 2% 1% 1% 1% 1%
rent from a local authority 5% 4% 5% 4% 4%
own outright 58% 56% 56% 55% 56%
own with mortgage 35% 40% 38% 39% 38%
refused 0% 0% 0% 1% 0%
does house have a BER cert
yes 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
no 86% 88% 88% 87% 87%
don’t know 13% 11% 11% 12% 12%
Number of people over 15
1 4% 5% 5% 4% 4%
2 62% 58% 61% 61% 61%
3 20% 20% 17% 16% 18%
4 9% 12% 12% 12% 11%
5 3% 4% 3% 6% 4%
6 1% 1% 1% 0% 1%
7 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Number of people under 15
0 77% 72% 72% 73% 74%
1 10% 11% 12% 13% 11%
2 8% 11% 9% 8% 9%
3 3% 4% 5% 4% 4%
4 2% 1% 1% 1% 1%
5 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
6 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Number of bedrooms
1 1% 0% 0% 1% 1%
2 11% 9% 6% 10% 9%
3 43% 46% 45% 40% 43%
4 35% 34% 35% 37% 35%
5 10% 11% 13% 12% 11%
6 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
House age
1900− 1940 2% 2% 2% 1% 8%
1941− 1960 3% 2% 3% 2% 10%
1961− 1970 3% 3% 3% 2% 10%
1971− 1980 6% 4% 5% 4% 18%
1981− 1990 3% 3% 3% 3% 11%
1990− 1997 2% 2% 2% 2% 8%
after 1997 6% 5% 5% 5% 21%
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5.2 Annex B
Table 11: Count of in-trial adoptions. Dependent variable in negative binomial
regression
count of adoptions Freq. Proportion
0 1,170 0.48
1 663 0.27
2 330 0.13
3 162 0.07
4 80 0.03
5 29 0.01
6 12 0.00
7 5 0.00
8 2 0.00
9 3 0.00
Total 2,456 1.00
Table 12: Dependent variable summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
depvar1 2456 0.52 0.50 0 1
depvar2 2456 0.99 1.29 0 9
14
